They were warned before Frankland was built.
A written assurance about Graylands’ patients. Government land sales and a school relocation. A 646-signature petition. A warning that security had to cover the move from a secure ward into the community. All were recorded in Parliament before the Frankland Centre opened. The later record shows why the next expansion must answer those questions before it proceeds.
The issue was already more than the strength of a fence. Parliament was told how government decisions had changed the site, why residents and schools objected, and where responsibility for security could fail. Those are the questions a new building alone cannot settle.
The quotations below reproduce the 1990 parliamentary record, with the speaker and printed Hansard page identified. Historical terms, including “criminally insane”, are retained inside attributed quotations. Ellipses mark omitted words. Open the original records →
An assurance about the patients. A different outcome.
On 29 November 1990, Colin Barnett, the member for Cottesloe, traced the changes preceding the proposed unit. He described the separation of Swanbourne and Graylands hospitals in 1980, followed by Swanbourne’s closure in 1983. Some patients went to Fremantle Prison; others went to Graylands. A concerned resident, Mrs Jones, had written to the Health Department about the closure and security at Graylands.
“The closure of the Swanbourne Hospital will not affect in any way the nature of the patient population at the Graylands Hospital. The two hospitals are separate entities.”
“However, that has not been the case since that letter was written and some of these quite dangerous and very disturbed people have been placed in low security facilities at Graylands Hospital.”
The contrast is explicit in Hansard: an assurance that the nature of the patient population would remain unchanged, followed by Barnett’s account that the assurance had not held. For today’s expansion, the corresponding questions are concrete: which patient groups will be admitted, what security and staffing each requires, who authorises changes, and how those changes will be disclosed.
Government helped create the neighbourhood beside the hospital.
Barnett described government selling former hospital land, under LandCorp’s supervision, for the St John’s Wood estate. He recorded purchasers’ firm expectation that a forensic facility would not be established next door. He separately described John XXIII College’s relocation following consultation with government:
“The people involved in that development, and those who purchased land, were of the firm opinion that no facility for the criminally insane or for mentally ill offenders would be established on adjacent land.”
“The college administration was under the impression, and was assured in various ways, that there would be no placement of mentally ill offenders in that area.”
He placed the July 1989 decision to build the forensic unit at Graylands against that background of assurances and expectations. The question of public trust arose from the gap between what the neighbours understood and what government subsequently decided to build.
“Government involvement has changed the nature of the site, and the proposed forensic unit is adjacent to a growing residential area, John XXIII College and Graylands Primary School is very close as well.”
The history of the hospital does not settle the suitability of every later use. Parliament was told that government had helped establish the surrounding homes and school, then selected the adjoining land for a specialist forensic unit. Any further expansion needs to be assessed against the neighbourhood that exists now. See the current site and plans →
The playground distance above describes the proposed 1990 unit in Barnett’s speech; it is not a measurement of the current expansion plans.
The “patients are already here” argument was made in 1990 too
Barnett expressly acknowledged that mentally ill offenders had been on the site. His distinction was the absence of a specialist facility following the hospital split:
“such patients have been on site, but no specialist facility has been provided.”
During an exchange about a particular patient, Premier Carmen Lawrence interjected:
“I am asking the question because most of those people are in Graylands right now.”
The exchange matters today: the existing service is part of the evidence, but the proposed scale, location, patient mix and operating model still need their own justification.
The reports, the alternative location and the disputed security assessment
Barnett set out a sequence of professional and government reports. The table records his account in Hansard.
| Report or decision | What Barnett put on the record |
|---|---|
| 1978 professional subcommittee | A WA subcommittee of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists recommended secure facilities under Corrective Services control; Barnett said the decision was ratified five years later. p.8174 ↗ |
| 1985 Cramond–Harding report | The external inquiry recommended a separate unit within a multifunctional prison facility, identified in the speech as Casuarina. p.8174 ↗ |
| Hill report | The departmental response objected to that recommendation, regarding a prison as incompatible with psychiatric treatment. p.8174 ↗ |
| 1988 Murray committee | The committee recommended Graylands. Barnett recorded criticism that it had not addressed security or some findings of the earlier external inquiry. p.8175 ↗ |
| July 1989 government decision | The decision to build at Graylands followed the Murray committee’s recommendation. p.8175 ↗ |
“The Murray committee report has subsequently been criticised because it did not address matters of security or some of the findings of the original Cramond–Harding report.”
He also recorded support for hospital placement and acknowledged differing professional opinions. His closing position expressly stopped short of insisting on a prison:
“I am not arguing that these people should necessarily be placed in a prison facility because I am not competent to make that recommendation.”
The lesson for the present decision is to publish the comparison and the security assessment. A preference for hospital-based treatment does not, by itself, resolve which hospital site or configuration best meets clinical and community needs.
646 signatures. The word was “before”.
On 8 May 1990, Bill Hassell, then the member for Cottesloe, tabled Petition No. 9 with 646 signatures. It asked for the plan to be abandoned and for any future proposal in a populous suburb beside schools and playgrounds to meet this requirement:
“Any future plan to open a prison/forensic unit within a populous suburb and next to schools and playgrounds be fully discussed with and justified to the community and all relevant authorities and interests before such future decision is made.”
By November, Barnett named organised opposition from John XXIII College’s committee and the St John’s Wood Residents’ Association. He described it as “a very reasoned and responsible opposition coming from informed people”. He also recorded that the Premier had met a college delegation in September and that it had sought an independent public inquiry into security. pp.8175–8176 ↗
The request was for a reasoned site decision with public scrutiny before commitment. The later consultation on admission guidelines was useful, but answered a narrower question after the unit had been built.
The warning covered what happens beyond a secure ward.
Barnett accepted that a forensic unit could be made highly secure. His concern extended to transfers into lower security, the surrounding hospital and neighbourhood, and who carried responsibility for protection throughout that process.
“Fourthly, part of the treatment and rehabilitation of mentally ill offenders involves a transition process, with offenders progressively being taken from areas of high security to low security to presumably no security. If that process works well, hopefully the treatment has been successful and they are rehabilitated. In doing that, there is an inherent risk and it is inevitable that there will be cases of failures in the process and mentally ill offenders will commit further offences against innocent parties, whether they be civil patients or residents or children.”
His proposed response was a physical separation at the first transition out of the highest security:
“It therefore requires for those most dangerous patients, the criminally insane, that the first transition from the highest security, a forensic unit, should be protected by some form of buffer zone.”
The buffer in this passage is separation for security during rehabilitation. The Subiaco wastewater odour buffer is a separate planning constraint.
He also asked who would carry the security responsibility.
“I think it is unreasonable that medical professionals should be given the added responsibility of providing security for these people and the responsibility of ensuring the security of adjoining residents and school children.”
That makes staffing, handovers, supervision, escalation and public notification central to the case. The community needs to see how responsibility is assigned when a patient changes ward, leaves the campus or fails to return.
These were already known concerns in 1990
“I remind members that Graylands has a history of security breaches. Mentally ill offenders and dangerous people have wandered into the adjoining residential area. In fact, three people who could be considered dangerous have wandered out this year.”
In the same passage he described a sexual assault after a patient left low-security care three years earlier. He expressly distinguished that patient from an offender. These were events discussed before Frankland existed, involving the wider Graylands service. They explain why his 1990 warning was based on experience already reported to Parliament.
Patient welfare was part of the case from the beginning.
Barnett recorded an unexpected call from the mother of a patient whose identity he withheld. She supported his concern about the location because she feared the effect on her son’s rehabilitation:
“She said that she hoped her son was not put in a forensic unit in a residential area because that would concentrate public opinion on him and other patients. That would make it more difficult for her son to be rehabilitated.”
He also discussed the risk of stigma attaching to the hospital’s civil patients and their families. His own summary joined patient care and public safety:
“It is an issue that involves the best care and due sympathy for those patients. It is an issue that also has important implications for public safety and the security and safety of the patients concerned.”
A well-chosen, properly resourced service should protect patients, clinical staff, families and neighbours together. Those groups all have an interest in a credible location assessment, clear responsibilities and arrangements that support treatment without leaving foreseeable risks unanswered.
What government subsequently did
1993: existing patients could move; admission rules went to consultation.
On 10 October 1993, Health Minister Peter Foss announced that Frankland would be ready on 25 October. Existing Graylands patients eligible under the current admission policy would move into it. He said:
“No person will be admitted unless they would previously have qualified for admission to the old facility.”
Forensic admission required specialist and departmental clinical endorsements, a Health Minister recommendation to the Attorney-General, and agreement by the Governor in Executive Council. Eligibility depended on treatable psychiatric illness; custody alone was insufficient, with provision for return to a correctional facility.
It announced newspaper advertisements, letters and pamphlets about proposed admission guidelines. Comments closed 30 November 1993, after the announced move-in date for existing eligible patients; review was scheduled for 1 July 1994. Read the arrangements ↗
This precedent gives today’s community two separate standards to ask for: scrutiny of the location before further commitment, and published admission and operating rules before patients move in. Consultation about the second cannot substitute for answering the first. Read the wider community history →
2014: the MP who warned Parliament was now Premier.
Enoch Walsh failed to return from authorised leave on 5 October 2014. ABC reported that he had been staying at Romily House, a low-security care facility in Claremont, and that the review board was working with police and Frankland staff to return him to custody. Police warned the public not to approach him.
“We should create a specialist facility which is situated in an isolated area surrounded by a buffer zone. It will cost money and it will cause inconvenience to psychiatric staff, but that is a cost this community must bear.”
“The correct procedures were followed”
“I’m sure he’ll either turn up or be found.”
Barnett defended the handling of the absence; Attorney-General Michael Mischin said Walsh had previously complied with leave conditions. Opposition Leader Mark McGowan criticised the delay in informing the public. Read the report and responses ↗
The contrast is between the safeguard demanded in 1990 and the reassurance offered in 2014. This was a failure to return from authorised leave at another facility, rather than a breach of Frankland’s perimeter. It illustrates why security must be assessed across the care pathway, including what happens when an authorised arrangement fails. A statement that procedures were followed does not answer whether those procedures provided adequate protection.
Graded security and community leave were part of this history long before the 2023 mental-impairment legislation. The present question is how the proposed expansion’s operating model addresses that established experience. See the separately sourced incident record →
Before the next expansion, answer the questions already on the record.
The 1990 material establishes prior notice: the location, the surrounding schools and homes, the changing patient population, and the responsibilities involved in moving between levels of security were all raised in Parliament. The current proposal should show what has been learned from that history.
- Publish the site comparison. Show how Graylands was assessed against alternatives, including today’s neighbouring schools and homes, clinical needs, security arrangements and future expansion.
- Publish an independent assessment of the whole care pathway. Address secure wards, transfers, lower-security care, authorised leave, failure to return, staff responsibilities and notification to affected neighbours.
- State the admission and operating rules. Explain the patient categories, eligibility, security levels, decision-makers and process for changing the model. The 1993 record shows that public explanations of these matters are possible.
- Show what changed after recorded failures. Identify the lessons, corrective actions and evidence that current arrangements work. Specify who is accountable when responsibilities cross agencies or facilities.
- Consult while the decision can still change. Give residents, schools, patients, families and staff the evidence and a meaningful opportunity to respond before further commitment to Stage 1 and later expansion.
Pause Stage 1. Publish the evidence. Justify the location. The petitioners asked for that sequence in 1990. The parliamentary and subsequent management records give today’s community a stronger basis for insisting on it.
Read the original records
The Hansard links open the full sitting PDFs at the relevant PDF page. Printed parliamentary page numbers are given separately. Quotations from letters and other people’s accounts are identified as they appear in Barnett’s speech.
- WA Legislative Assembly, 8 May 1990, p.320 — Petition No. 9, tabled by Bill Hassell; 646 signatures.
- WA Legislative Assembly, 29 November 1990, p.8174 — hospital changes, the Bell letter, transfers and competing reports.
- 29 November 1990, p.8175 — the Murray committee, July 1989 decision, land sales, college assurances and school proximity.
- 29 November 1990, p.8176 — the mother’s call, Premier Lawrence’s interjection, the inquiry request and patient welfare.
- 29 November 1990, p.8177 — transitions, a security buffer, staffing, previous incidents and Barnett’s conclusion.
- WA Government, 10 October 1993: Frankland admission and consultation announcement.
- ABC News, 7 October 2014, updated 9 October: the Walsh absence and government responses.
See also: the longer site history · the safety record · current plans and scale · full source list.